Economic Evaluation in Health · Faculty workshop · Session 5
Drummond et al., Methods for the Economic Evaluation of Health Care
Programmes, 4th ed., 2015.
Chapter 4, pages 77 to 123.
Faculty, residents and research project staff · AIIMS Bhopal, 23 September 2026
| Measure | Captures | Comparable across |
|---|---|---|
| Deaths averted, cases detected, mmHg lowered | one dimension only | the same outcome only |
| Life-years gained | length of life | anything affecting survival |
| QALYs and DALYs | length and quality | any health programme |
Cost per case detected cannot be set against cost per stroke prevented, so you cannot allocate a budget.
India's recommendation: use QALYs.
A year of life in full health is worth 1. A year in a worse state is worth less. Add them up.
The weight, the utility, runs from 1 for full health to 0 for a state as good as being dead, and can go below zero for states judged worse than death.
Two years at a utility of 0.5 count the same as one year at 1.0.
That equivalence is the QALY's power and its controversy. It is what lets you compare a cancer programme with a mental health programme. It also makes people uneasy, because the arithmetic treats those two years and that one year as interchangeable.
Quality up, years across; the area is the QALYs. Produce the same gain three ways: more years, better quality, or fewer but much better years.
All three are identical to the QALY, which is its central limitation · sph-aiimsbhopal.github.io/intro-economic-evaluation-health
How many of your 10 years in this state would you give up to be in full health for the rest?
What risk of immediate death would you accept for a certain cure?
Describe your health on five dimensions and five levels. A national value set converts that to a number.
The values come from the general public, not from patients.
Deliberately so. The public bear the opportunity cost and fund the system. Patients who have adapted to a condition rate it higher than the public do, which would systematically reduce the apparent value of treating it.
The DEVINE study produced an EQ-5D-5L value set for India, so utilities no longer have to be borrowed.
Applying a UK tariff to Indian patients is now an avoidable flaw.
| Age group | What the Reference Case asks for |
|---|---|
| Adults | EQ-5D-5L with the Indian value set |
| 8 to 15 years | EQ-5D-Y, five-level |
| 4 to 15 years, valuation | the Indian adult value set, until a paediatric one exists |
| Under 4 years | DALYs permitted, using GBD disability weights |
Jyani, Sharma, Prinja, Kar et al., Value in Health, 2022.
Health produced. Preference-based weights from 0 to 1, usually from the general public. You maximise it.
Health lost. Disability weights plus years of life lost against a reference life expectancy. You minimise it.
"ICER per DALY averted is not directly equivalent to ICER per QALY gained."
Session 6 puts up an Indian league table that mixes 70% DALY studies with 30% QALY studies. Remember this slide when you see it: that is why the table cannot be read straight down the column.
A rupee next year is worth less than a rupee today. So, the argument goes, is a QALY. Discounting converts future costs and health into present values, so programmes with different timing can be compared at all.
3% is chosen partly so Indian results can be compared with everyone else's.
A cost paid at 14, health arriving from 30. Move the rate 0% to 5% and read the two "retained" figures: the cost barely moves, the health falls away.
Which is why prevention looks worse at any given rate · sph-aiimsbhopal.github.io/intro-economic-evaluation-health
Discounting health at the same rate as money disadvantages prevention, and therefore the young, whose benefits arrive furthest in the future. Some argue health should be discounted less, or not at all.
If health is discounted less than money, then delaying any programme by a year makes it look better, and you could generate unlimited apparent gain by never starting. That is absurd, so the rates should match.
Neither side has won. State your rate, test it, and report undiscounted results too.
ICER = C1 − C0E1 − E0 = ΔCΔE
1 is the new option, 0 the comparator. C and E are discounted totals per person.
| Unit of E | What the ICER is then called | Read as |
|---|---|---|
| QALYs gained | Cost–utility ratio | ₹ per QALY gained |
| DALYs averted | Cost per DALY averted | ₹ per DALY averted |
| Cases detected, deaths averted | Cost-effectiveness ratio | ₹ per case, ₹ per death averted |
Same formula. Only the denominator changes.
Using C1 ÷ E1 instead of the differences. Gives an absurdly small number, as on the next slide.
The ratio explodes, or is undefined at exactly zero. The two options may still differ in cost, which matters.
ΔC ÷ ΔE is the same number whether both are positive or both negative, and those are opposite decisions.
A negative ICER is uninterpretable on its own. You have to go back and look at the signs of ΔC and ΔE separately.
Net monetary benefit fixes all three. We get to it shortly.
Screening with VIA every five years, over a lifetime, discounted at 3%:
| Cost per woman | QALYs | Ratio | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Average ratio | ₹4,600 | 22.530 | ₹204 per QALY |
| Incremental ratio, vs no screening | ₹3,400 | 0.130 | ₹26,154 per QALY |
₹204 per QALY is not a bargain. It is a meaningless number.
The average ratio divides the programme's cost by her entire remaining lifetime of quality-adjusted life, almost all of which she would have had anyway. Only the incremental ratio asks what we get for the extra money.
Illustrative figures, constructed for teaching.
Per woman, lifetime, 3% discounting. Ranked by cost, where you always start.
| Strategy | Cost | QALYs | ΔCost | ΔQALYs | ICER |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| No screening | ₹1,200 | 22.400 | – | – | – |
| VIA every 10 years | ₹3,400 | 22.440 | ₹2,200 | 0.040 | ₹55,000 |
| VIA every 5 years | ₹4,600 | 22.530 | ₹1,200 | 0.090 | ₹13,333 |
| Cytology every 5 years | ₹6,800 | 22.515 | ₹2,200 | −0.015 | – |
| HPV DNA every 5 years | ₹9,100 | 22.560 | ₹2,300 | 0.045 | ₹51,111 |
Two of these should never be chosen at any threshold. Which two?
Illustrative figures, constructed for teaching.
Cytology every 5 years costs ₹6,800 for 22.515 QALYs. VIA every 5 years costs ₹4,600 for 22.530.
More expensive and less effective. Strike it out. No threshold can rescue it.
This is the north-west quadrant of the cost-effectiveness plane, met again in a table. Once an option is dominated, remove it and recompute the ICERs below it, because the comparisons have changed.
Its ICER is not "very large". It is negative and meaningless, which is why the column shows a dash.
Read the ICER column downwards: ₹55,000 for VIA every 10 years, then ₹13,333 for VIA every 5 years.
The ICER falls as you move down. That cannot be right.
VIA every 10 years is extendedly dominated: at any threshold where you would accept it, you would already have accepted the better-value option below it.
| After removing both dominated options | Cost | QALYs | ICER |
|---|---|---|---|
| No screening | ₹1,200 | 22.400 | – |
| VIA every 5 years | ₹4,600 | 22.530 | ₹26,154 |
| HPV DNA every 5 years | ₹9,100 | 22.560 | ₹1,50,000 |
Now the ICERs rise as cost rises.
| Strategy | ICER vs the option below | At λ ≈ ₹2,12,307, for now |
|---|---|---|
| VIA every 5 years | ₹26,154 | accept |
| HPV DNA every 5 years | ₹1,50,000 | accept, and the last that qualifies |
Climb the frontier one step at a time, for as long as each step costs less than λ per QALY.
Borrow λ for now: ₹2 lakh per QALY, near a published Indian estimate. At ₹80,000 instead you would stop at VIA every five years. The question is not "which is best" but "how far up can we afford to go", and where that λ comes from is Session 6.
Illustrative figures. Threshold from Chugh et al., Value in Health, 2026.
The ranking you just did, drawn. The frontier is the set of points you would climb, and a dominant option sits below and to the right of another. Drag λ and the verdict changes.
On your phone: sph-aiimsbhopal.github.io/intro-economic-evaluation-health
NMB = (λ × ΔE) − ΔC
Value the health gained at the threshold, then subtract what it cost. Both terms in rupees.
Positive means adopt. That is the whole rule.
No division, so nothing explodes when ΔE is small, and the sign carries the meaning that an ICER loses.
VIA every 5 years, from the table: ΔE = 0.090 QALYs, ΔC = ₹1,200, at India's λ of ₹2,12,307.
(2,12,307 × 0.090) − 1,200 = +₹17,908 per woman
| Form | Formula | Adopt when |
|---|---|---|
| ICER | ΔC ÷ ΔE | ICER < λ, and ΔE > 0 |
| Net monetary benefit | (λ × ΔE) − ΔC | NMB > 0 |
| Net health benefit | ΔE − (ΔC ÷ λ) | NHB > 0 |
NHB is NMB divided by λ, so it says the same thing in QALYs instead of rupees: the health you buy, minus the health displaced elsewhere to pay for it.
All three agree, but only the ICER needs a side condition.
| ICER | Net monetary benefit | |
|---|---|---|
| When ΔE = 0 | undefined | fine, it is just −ΔC |
| Dominated vs dominant | both negative, indistinguishable | opposite signs |
| North-east vs south-west | same value, opposite meaning | opposite signs |
| Averaging across simulations | incoherent | straightforward |
Which is why probabilistic analysis is counted on NMB, not on the ratio.
One year of adjuvant trastuzumab against chemotherapy alone. Same model, same costs, same country. Only the source of the effectiveness estimate differs.
| Effectiveness estimate from | QALYs gained | ICER per QALY gained |
|---|---|---|
| The HERA trial | 1.29 | ₹1,78,877 |
| Joint NSABP B-31 and NCCTG N9831 analysis | 1.69 | ₹1,34,413 |
Nothing in the numerator moved. A bigger denominator made the ICER a third smaller.
Which is why the incremental ratio is a claim about two numbers, not one. Session 8 returns to this table and puts a probability on each row.
Gupta, Verma, Gupta, Prinja, JCO Global Oncology, 2020.
Faculty workshop · Session 6 · Drummond 4th ed., Chapter 2
You have just ranked five strategies against a threshold you were handed. The next session asks who set it, by which of two incompatible methods, and what follows when the two disagree.
Also: opportunity cost, league tables, and budget impact, the question a finance department asks that an ICER does not answer.